

7 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kerr

FROM:

[REDACTED]

STAT

SUBJECT:

Allison Model for Separation of the DCI
from the CIA

1. This memorandum will do the following three things:

a. Describe the reorganization of the Intelligence Community recommended by Graham Allison and Peter Szanton in their book Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection.

b. Analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the proposal as we see them.

c. Suggest modifications of the proposal which we believe would improve it.

2. The essence of the Graham/Szanton position is the following:

a. The CIA should be split, with analytical and covert action/collection functions separate. The resultant analytical element should be free of operational and policy responsibilities. Its head should be the DCI. To be called the Foreign Assessment Agency, this element would perform most of the functions of the present CIA DDI; it would not be engaged in any collection. It would contain a reconstituted Board of National Estimates. Its head would be the DCI, who would be the principal foreign intelligence advisor to the President, but would have no responsibility for clandestine collection or covert action, or for direction or coordination of the Intelligence Community as a whole.

b. A Special Services Agency should be created to perform clandestine collection of intelligence and covert action. An independent agency, it would report to the President through the Secretary of State. (In the Allison scheme, the National Security Council has been abolished.)

This document may be

Unclassified

Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79M00095A000100030028-1

CL BY

[REDACTED]

STAT

c. There would be established within the Executive Office of the President a new position, Assistant to the President for Intelligence, who would be responsible for the following tasks: establishing intelligence consumer priorities, assessing producer performance, and developing intelligence budgets for the entire Community.

d. By implication (in that no other alternative is put forth) the Allison scheme would leave other elements of the Community organized as at present. See the attached schematic for the essential relationships.

e. It is also recommended that consumers form their own analytical elements, such as the net assessment group in Defense, to provide diversity and competition in analysis.

f. Active Congressional oversight is an essential element in the Allison plan. There would also be established an Inspector General for Intelligence reporting to both the President and the Congress.

3. Some of the advantages of the proposed scheme include the following:

a. It provides for absolute control of the intelligence budget, rather than the strained negotiatory scheme which exists at present.

b. It separates out covert action/collection, thereby removing a source of "tainting" in the minds of some for the analytical effort.

c. Gives greater visibility to the oversight and control function through creation of an Intelligence Inspector General, which would probably inspire more confidence simply through being more obvious than the present arrangements which work well but are hard to understand.

d. Prescribes duties for the Assistant to the President for Intelligence which lend themselves well to his being supported by the Intelligence Community Staff as presently constituted.

e. Insures DCI control of the analytical base for the production of national intelligence.

f. It is difficult to determine, in the absence of a detailed implementing scheme for analysis, whether the proposed plan would in fact result in the improvement in analytical performance which its proponents claim. Elimination of the name of CIA might result in being able to recruit some good analytical talent which would otherwise not consider signing on, and might make it possible to renew ties with universities, but that is highly speculative. Of much greater potential significance would be whether the analysts, divorced from all collection activities, would be able to obtain the raw data they needed from collection agencies they had no control over, and whether that input would come to them unfiltered by bureaucratic interests and biases. This is problematical at best.

4. Some of the disadvantages of the proposed scheme include these:

a. Placing covert action under the Department of State would run the risk of "tainting" all legitimate State operations, which could be viewed as potentially cover for the covert function. This is already a problem now, and one which would be much exacerbated by the proposed organization.

b. The scheme fails to define the relationship between the Foreign Assessment Agency and the collection agencies upon which it would rely for input.

c. No provision is made for continuation of overt collection activities (such as FBIS).

d. Retaining the term DCI, but with radically changed responsibilities, can only create confusion.

e. It removes the Assistant to the President for Intelligence, who is responsible for the assignment of priorities to intelligence consumers, the allocation of assets (in formulation of the intelligence budget), and the assessment of intelligence performance from the line of authority over the elements of the Community.


f. This proposal requires legislation before it can be implemented.

5. It should be recognized that Messrs Allison and Szanton are dealing with the organizational problem in a general manner and leave many unexplained details. (We can critique these shortcomings later if you wish). It should also be recognized that the Allison model seems remarkably well suited to the physical distribution of staffs we will have after ICS moves downtown. It would be convenient for the new Assistant to the President for Intelligence to have his staff (formerly ICS) within a short walking distance of the White House. The size of that staff insures that he does not become a bureaucratic light weight, as some have suggested.

6. Attached at the second schematic is a modification of the Allison proposal which we believe meets many of these objections without introducing new difficulties. It provides for one person (Assistant to the President for Intelligence) to coordinate the Intelligence Community from a resources standpoint, and one (Director of the National Production Agency) to coordinate it from a substantive standpoint. It should be noted that this is a scheme which is arrived at by revising the Allison proposal, and not necessarily the ideal which might result from starting from scratch.

Attachments
As stated

25X1



-----: RESPONSIBILITY FOR:

- ESTAB CONSUMER PRIORITIES
- ASSESSING PRODUCER PERP
- DEVELOPING BUDGETS FOR INTELL

INTELLIGENCE
IG

NSC

ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT
FOR INTELLIGENCE++

NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCTION
AGENCY++

NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION
AGENCY

DEPT OF DEFENSE

NRO

NSA

HUMINT

CTRINTEL

OPEN

CLAUDESTINE

DIA

A/N/AF
INTEL

CSS
(CENTRAL
SECURITY
SERVICE)

COVERT
ACTION
AGENCY

RESPONSIBILITY FOR:

- INTELL POLICY AND PLANNING
- ESTAB CONSUMER PRIORITIES
- ASSESSING PRODUCER PERFORMANCE
- DEVELOPING INTEL BUDGETS

+ IF CONTINUATION OF A
STANDING COVERT ACTION
CAPABILITY IS ESTEEMED
TO BE DESIRABLE.

++ DIRECTOR IS PRINCIPAL
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79M00095A000100030028-1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79M00095A000100030028-1